State v. Gandenberger Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39557 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-4-2013
State v. Gandenberger Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
39557
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Gandenberger Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39557" (2013). Not Reported. 579.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/579
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
MICHAELA. ) 
GAN DEN BERGE~ ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 39557 
ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2010-2180 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRI OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE LYNN NORTON 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8701 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
11 · FlLi:O - COPY 7 i 
i 
I 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ........................................... ., .............................. 2 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 4 
Absent Any Substantial And Competent Evidence To Support 
A Finding That Mr. Gandenberger Willfully Violated The Terms 
Of His Probation, The District Court's Decision To Revoke 
Mr. Gandenberger's Probation Was In Error .............................................. 4 
A. Introduction .................................................. .' ........................................ 4 
B. The Decision To Revoke Mr. Gandenberger's Probation 
Without Finding A Willful Violation Was In Error Under 
Either The Old Rule Or The New Rule, Which May Be 
Applied Retroactively ............................................................................ 5 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................................... 7 
Kribel v. State, 148 Idaho 188 (Ct. App. 2009) ................................................. 5, 6 
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130 (2009) .............................................................. 6 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) ....................................................... 7 
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) ..................................................... 5, 6 
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862 (1992) ................................................................... 6 
State v. Fife, 114 Idaho 103 (Ct. App. 1988) .................................................. 9, 10 
State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................................... 9 
State v. Keaveny, 136 Idaho 31 (2000) ................................................................ 7 
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918 (Ct. App. 2003) ................................................. 7 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................................. 7 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102 (2009) .............................................................. 7 
State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007) .................................................................... 7 
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370 (2002) .................................................................. 8 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) .............................................................. 5, 6 
Rules 
I.C.R. 33(e) ................................................................................................... 4, 6, 7 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Gandenberger appeals from the district court's decision to revoke his 
probation even though he did not willfully violate the terms of his probation. In fact, the 
evidence demonstrates that he was trying to comply with the terms of his probation. 
Mr. Gandenberger asserts that I.C.R. 33(e), which requires the district court to find a 
willful violation of probation before it can revoke probation, may, and should, be applied 
retroactively. He asserts that the district court did not find he was willfully in the 
presence of children without a supervisor, but merely willfully in the presence of 
children, which does not prove a violation, much less a willful violation, of that term of 
his probation. Alternatively, he contends that, under the old rule regarding revocation of 
probation, the district court failed to consider alternative means of addressing the 
violation, and so erred in revoking his probation under the old rule. 
The State challenges his analysis in regard to the retroactive application of 
I.C.R. 33(e) and advocates for a presumption of a willful violation in that a general 
finding of willfulness is all that is necessary to prove a violation of the terms of 
probation. That position is directly contrary to case law and improperly shifts the burden 
of proof in such cases. Finally, the State also contends that the district court considered 
alternatives to revocation, even though it did not actually have information to consider in 
that regard and dismissed potential alternatives anyway. If such discussion can be 
considered "consideration" it certainly was not sufficient to meet the standard for such 
consideration. 
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As such, because there was no evidence supporting any finding of a willful 
violation of the terms of Mr. Gandenberger's probation, this Court should reverse the 
district court's erroneous decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Gandenberger's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether, absent any substantial and competent evidence to support a finding that 
Mr. Gandenberger willfully violated the terms of his probation, the district court's 
decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in error. 
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ARGUMENT 
Absent Any Substantial And Competent Evidence To Support A Finding That 
Mr. Gandenberger Willfully Violated The Terms Of His Probation, The District 
Court's Decision To Revoke Mr. Gandenberger's Probation Was In Error 
A. Introduction 
The district court erroneously revoked Mr. Gandenberger's probation because 
the violation of his probation was not willful. Based on the information he had received 
from a prior probation officer, Mr. Gandenberger believed that he was complying with 
the terms of his probation by being in the presence of a responsible adult (his stepfather 
and others) when he was around children at a family barbeque hosted by his stepfather. 
Under the new rule set forth in I.C.R. 33(e) (effective approximately six months after 
the revocation of Mr. Gandenberger's probation), the district court's decision to revoke 
Mr. Gandenberger's probation on that evidence was erroneous. Even though 
I.C.R. 33(e) post-dates Mr. Gandenberger's violation, it can and should be applied 
retroactively because it affects his substantial rights by altering what punishment may 
be imposed for a given action. However, even under the old rule, because the district 
court did not actually consider alternatives to incarceration because it did not have 
sufficient evidence of available alternatives (even though it could have ordered 
production of such evidence), it did not properly revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation 
upon a non-willful violation of his probation. Therefore, this Court should reverse that 
erroneous decision. 
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8. The Decision To Revoke Mr. Gandenberger's Probation Without Finding A Willful 
Violation Was In Error Under Either The Old Rule Or The New Rule, Which May 
Be Applied Retroactively 
The applicability of the retroactivity doctrine does not hinge on whether the rule in 
question was promulgated as a procedural or substantive rule, as the State suggests. 
Rather, it hinges on the impact of the rule - whether it affects the substantive rights 
of the defendant. For example, the United States Supreme Court stated, when it 
established the current test for retroactive application of new rules, "a new rule should 
be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those procedures that ... are 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) 
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (in turn quoting Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))) (emphasis added). Additionally, a rule may 
be applied retroactively if it "implicat[es] fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding." Kribel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 191 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007); Application of Gafford, 127 Idaho 472, 
476 (1995)). As such, because new rules may simply consist of defining new 
procedures that affect the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding (such as 
which punishments are available in given situations), the retroactivity doctrine is not 
limited to only those rules established via substantive law-making authority, as the State 
believes. (Resp. Br., pp.6-8.) 
While the rule may be issued in terms of a new procedure, it may still be applied 
retroactively where it establishes procedures that impact on the substantive rights of the 
defendant (i.e., whether he can procedurally be deprived of his liberty for a certain 
action). See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-53 (2004) (holding that the 
5 
rules which impact the criminality or potential punishment of an act should generally 
apply retroactively); Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 (2009) (same). I.C.R. 33(e) 
does exactly that: it procedurally limits what punishment may be applied in a given set 
of circumstances: "The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by 
the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully 
violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(e). Therefore, even though the rule was 
promulgated as a procedural rule, see State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863 (1992), it 
impacts the substantial rights of defendants, specifically, their ongoing liberty. As such, 
I.C.R. 33(e) should apply retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352-53; 
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 307; Kribel, 148 Idaho at 191. 
In this case, there was no evidence that Mr. Gandenberger willfully violated the 
terms of his probation. Mr. Gandenberger was alleged to have violated Term 3 of his 
probation agreement (R., p.160), which reads: "I will not initiate, maintain, or establish 
contact with any person, male or female, under the age of 18 years without the 
presence of an approved supervisor. The supervisor must be over the age of 21 and be 
approved by both my supervising officer and therapist." (State's Exhibit 5 (emphasis 
added).) The State makes two claims regarding proof of the willfulness of the violation: 
that "the presumption is that the violation was willful" (Resp. Br., p.10 n.3), and a 
showing that Mr. Gandenberger was willfully in contact wi.th children was sufficient. 
(Resp. Br., p.12.) It is wrong on both counts. 
First, there is no presumption that the violation is willful. Willfulness is an 
element that must be proved by the State: "Unless the state shows that the violation 
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was 'willful,' it is fundamentally unfair for the court to revoke probation .... "1 State 
v. Knutsen (hereinafter, Knutsen I), 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis 
added); State v. Lafferty, ·125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994 ); see State v. Rose, 144 
Idaho 762, 765 (2007) ("The state bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a 
violation."); State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106 (2009) (quoting State v. Leach, 135 
Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 )) ("If a knowing and intentional probation violation has 
been proved . ... ") (emphasis added); see also Knutsen v. State (hereinafter, Knutsen 
//), 144 Idaho 433, 441-42 (Ct. App. 2007) (identifying willfulness of the violation as 
a material issue in probation revocation proceedings); I.C.R. 33(e). This precedent 
reveals that the State's advocacy of a presumption of willfulness should be rejected; the 
State must actually offer proof of the willful violation. Furthermore, shifting the State's 
burden of proving of proving a willful violation by making it a presumption which the 
defense must rebut violates the defendant's right to due process. State v. Keaveny, 
136 Idaho 31, 33 (2000); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979). 
Therefore, it is wholly inconsistent with precedent and the Constitution for there to be a 
presumption that a violation of probation terms is willful. 
Second, the finding that Mr. Gandenberger was just willfully in the presence of 
children does not demonstrate that he willfully violated the term of his probation which 
1 Under the new rule set forth in I.C.R. 33(e), that is the end of the inquiry - no showing 
of willfulness means no revocation of probation. The old rule, however, allowed for a 
revocation of probation after consideration of "whether adequate alternative methods of 
punishing the defendant are available." Knutsen I, 138 Idaho at 923; Lafferty, 125 Idaho 
at 382. As will be discussed infra, the district court did not engage in a sufficient 
consideration of such alternatives, if it engaged in any such consideration at all, and so, 
even under the old rule, the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's 
probation was in error. 
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he was alleged to have violated. That term of Mr. Gandenberger's probation reads: 
"I will not initiate, maintain, or establish contact with any person, male or female, under 
the age of 18 years without the presence of an approved supervisor. The supervisor 
must be over the age of 21 and be approved by both my supervising officer and 
therapist." (State's Exhibit 5.) A plain reading of that term of probation, including 
the clause "without the presence of an approved supervisor," reveals that 
Mr. Gandenberger is actually permitted to initiate, maintain, or establish contact with 
children so long as he is within the presence of an approved supervisor. ( See State's 
Exhibit 5.) Therefore, to violate that provision, two facts must be in evidence: 
(1) Mr. Gandenberger had to willfully initiate, maintain, or establish contact with a 
person under 18 years of age, and (2) Mr. Gandenberger had to do so when he was 
willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor. (See State's Exhibit 5.) The 
district court's finding, which the State promotes as sufficient, only considers the first of 
those two facts. (Tr., Vol.3, p.35, Ls.1-4; Resp. Br., p.12.) Without proof that 
Mr. Gandenberger was willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor, he 
cannot properly have been found to be in willful violation of that term of his probation. 
Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Gandenberger was trying to 
comply with this term of probation. This is critical because The Idaho Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals have both recognized that, where a person is making good 
faith efforts to conform his actions to the requirements of the. law, punishing him (in this 
case, depriving him of his liberty) for those good faith efforts, even if they are erroneous, 
is unacceptable. See State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002) (refusing to allow the 
8 
defendant to "be subjected to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out 
poorly-innocent mistakes in judgment"); State v. Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho 165, 170 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (same). In this case, the only evidence in regard to whether 
Mr. Gandenberger willfully ignored this term of his probation, specifically, whether he 
was willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor, demonstrates 
Mr. Gandenberger's attempt to conform with that term of probation. The uncontradicted 
evidence demonstrates that one of Mr. Gandenberger's prior probation officers had told 
him and his stepfather that this term meant, so long as a responsible adult was present, 
Mr. Gandenberger could be around children and still adhere to the terms of his 
probation. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.14, Ls.6-19.) As such, he was relying on the 
representation of a legitimate source of authority to make his decisions in this regard. 2 
Furthermore, conscious efforts were made to ensure that Mr. Gandenberger would be 
with responsible adults at all times during the barbeque, when he would be around the 
younger members of his family. (Tr., Vol.2, p.5, Ls.6-22.) 
This is different than the situation in Fife, where the fact of willful possession of 
firearms alone was sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the term of probation. 
State v. Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 104-05 (Ct. App. 1988). In that case, there was no 
qualifying clause in the term that would abrogate that provision if other certain 
circumstances were present. (Compare State's Exhibit 5 (allowing Mr. Gandenberger to 
2 Given the fact that Mr. Gandenberger suffers from paranoid schizophrenia to the point 
where his stepfather is attempting to gain guardianship over him (Tr., Vol.1, p.40, 
Ls.15-18; Tr., Vol.3, p.16, L.19 - p.19, L.9), and the fact that his current probation officer 
was unaware of those facts, nor would he talk with Mr. Gandenberger's stepfather, 
Mr. Gandenberger's efforts, relying on the assistance of his stepfather, are perfectly 
reasonable attempts to conform with this term of his probation. 
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initiate contact with children if he is within the presence of an approved supervisor).) 
Therefore, the colloquy in Fife about the terms of probation, wherein the defendant 
stated he understood the terms thereof, was sufficient to demonstrate his understanding 
of the terms. See Fife, 114 Idaho at 105-06 (the term in that case was "Basically that 
being a convicted felon fell under the Federal Firearms Statute which prohibited him 
from having ownership, control or possession of any workable firearms or ammunition," 
which, according to the Court of Appeals, clearly meant no possession of guns 
whatsoever) (emphasis from original). 
However, in Mr. Gandenberger's case, the term in question was not unequivocal. 
Compare Fife, 114 Idaho at 105. The description of the supervisor in the term is "over 
the age of 21 and be approved by both my supervising officer and therapist." (State's 
Exhibit 5.) That means, by the nature of the term itself, the term was fluid, subject to 
change at the whim of the supervising officer or the therapist. (See State's Exhibit 5.) 
According to the evidence, Mr. Gandenberger's prior probation officer essentially said 
that a responsible adult was an approved supervisor. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.14, Ls.6-
19.) Based on that information, Mr. Gandenberger believed, though erroneously, that 
he was complying with the terms of his probation.3 Comparft Fife, 114 Idaho at 105-06 
(wherein a clear, unqualified statement of the terms of probation left no room for the 
3 As Mr. Gandenberger's current probation officer was unaware of Mr. Gandenberger's 
significant mental health issues and would not talk to the person trying to establish 
guardianship over Mr. Gandenberger, it is unlikely that the current probation officer 
would have known of that advice or would have clarified the meaning of this term. 
(See Tr., Vol.3, p.7, Ls.6-9; Tr., Vol.3, p.13, Ls.7-9; Tr., Vol.2, p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.13.) 
It also seems axiomatic that Mr. Gandenberger's stepfather, who was trying to establish 
a guardianship over Mr. Gandenberger, should have been considered an approved 
supervisor. 
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misunderstanding asserted by that defendant). As such, his efforts, reasonably based 
on information given to him by a probation officer, should not have been the basis for 
revocation of his probation. I.C.R. 33(e); see Young, 138 Idaho at 373; Knutsen I, 138 
Idaho at 923; Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 170; Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382. 
Finally, the facts of this case demonstrate that Mr. Gandenberger could have 
been returned to probation, with a proper understanding of the term of probation and 
been successful, and thus, revocation was erroneous under the old rule regarding proof 
of a willful violation. (Tr., Vol.3, p.17, Ls.5-19 (Mr. Gandenberger's stepfather testifying 
that he was able to be supervise Mr. Gandenberger every day and would help him 
comply with the terms of his probation, as they had been clarified).) That is a significant 
alternative that needed to be considered because, according to his primary mental 
health care provider, "[t]he placement in an unfamiliar, sometimes chaotic environment 
[like prison] is likely to exacerbate an already fragile mental status." (2010 Peppersack 
letter attached to PSI.) The health care provider continues to advise that prison is 
inappropriate for Mr. Gandenberger, and that he should be placed in a community 
setting, such as an assisted living or certified family home. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) 
Prison would only serve to undermine Mr. Gandenberger's rehabilitation.4 (Defendant's 
4 The district court, in considering whether probation is appropriate, must determine 
"whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of 
the probation is consistent with the protection of society." State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 
308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). There are criteria which have been established to guide that 
determination. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-2521); see 
also State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, to be considered in this regard are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence 
of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and 
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing). According to the person treating 
Mr. Gandenberger, sending him to prison would destabilize him, which means prison 
would not serve the goal of rehabilitation and would ultimately undermine the protection 
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Exhibit A; 2010 Peppersack letter attached to PSI.) That alternative, as well as the 
alternatives of assisted living facilities, were dismissed without investigation or sufficient 
consideration by the district court. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.37, Ls.17-20.) 
As to the alternative of an assisted living program, the district court could have 
ordered production of information in that regard so that it could adequately consider that 
alternative. See Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382-83 (wherein the district court, after finding a 
violation of the terms of probation, allowed the defendant. a period of thirty days to 
locate a new facility in which to live in the community, and after the defendant presented 
evidence of such alternatives, the district court was able to properly decide how to 
proceed with the disposition of the probation violation). The district court could not 
consider information which it did not have.5 As such, it failed to consider the 
alternatives to incarceration, which would have better served the goals of sentencing. 
Cf State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106 (2009) (where the district court had specific 
information about alternative facilities in which to place the defendant, and after 
considering that specific information, determined they were not acceptable). Therefore, 
even under the old rule, which required consideration of such alternatives when the 
afforded society (as that result would be likely to destabilize Mr. Gandenberger then 
release him back into the community in that destabilized state). As such, the decision to 
revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was an abuse of discretion. See Merwin, 131 
Idaho at 648; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
5 There seems to be no tactical reason for defense counsel to have not presented such 
information at the disposition hearing. As a result, defense counsel may have been 
ineffective. That does not, however, deprive the district court of the ability to request 
submission of such information so that it could actually consider alternatives to 
incarceration. Compare Lafferrty, 125 Idaho at 382-83. As such, the district court failed 
to meet its obligations under the old rule when a non-willful violation of probation 
occurred. See id. Therefore, the decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was 
erroneous. See, e.g., Knutsen I, 138 Idaho at 923. · 
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violation was not willful, the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's 
probation was erroneous. 
Because evidence was not presented to show that Mr. Gandenberger was 
willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor (the only evidence on that point 
indicates that Mr. Gandenberger believed he was complying with that term of 
probation), there is no evidence that he willfully violated Term 3 of his probation. As 
such, under the new version of I.C.R. 33(e), which may, and should, apply retroactively 
because of the impact it has on defendants' substantive rights, the decision to revoke 
Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in error. However, even under the old rule, because 
the district court did not actually consider alternatives to incarceration, as it did not have 
evidence of alternatives, even though it could have ordered production of evidence in 
that regard, the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the district court's decision was based on a clearly erroneous 
determination that he had willfully violated the terms of his probation, Mr. Gandenberger 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order revoking his probation and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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